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Channel-Aware Adversarial Attacks Against Deep
Learning-Based Wireless Signal Classifiers
Brian Kim, Yalin E. Sagduyu, Kemal Davaslioglu, Tugba Erpek, and Sennur Ulukus
Abstract—This paper presents channel-aware adversarial at-
tacks against deep learning-based wireless signal classifiers. There
is a transmitter that transmits signals with different modulation
types. A deep neural network is used at each receiver to classify
its over-the-air received signals to modulation types. In the
meantime, an adversary transmits an adversarial perturbation
(subject to a power budget) to fool receivers into making errors
in classifying signals that are received as superpositions of trans-
mitted signals and adversarial perturbations. First, these evasion
attacks are shown to fail when channels are not considered in
designing adversarial perturbations. Then realistic attacks are
presented by considering channel effects from the adversary
to each receiver. After showing that a channel-aware attack
is selective (i.e., it affects only the receiver whose channel is
considered in the perturbation design), a broadcast adversarial
attack is presented by crafting a common adversarial pertur-
bation to simultaneously fool classifiers at different receivers.
The major vulnerability of modulation classifiers to over-the-air
adversarial attacks is shown by accounting for different levels
of information available about channel, transmitter input, and
classifier model. Finally, a certified defense based on randomized
smoothing that augments training data with noise is introduced to
make modulation classifier robust to adversarial perturbations.
Index Terms—Modulation classification, deep learning, adver-
sarial machine learning, adversarial attack, certified defense.
I. INTRODUCTION
Built upon the recent advances in computational resources
and algorithmic designs for deep neural networks, deep learn-
ing (DL) provides powerful means to learn and adapt to rich
data representations [2]. Spectrum data involved in wireless
communications is high dimensional due to the underlying
channel, interference and traffic effects, and reflects inter-
actions of network protocols that need to solve complex
tasks. Therefore, DL has found a broad range of applications
in wireless systems such as waveform design [3], spectrum
sensing [4], and signal classification [5].
As adversaries can manipulate training and testing time
input of machine learning (ML) algorithms, adversarial ML
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has emerged to study the operation of ML models in the
presence of adversaries and support safe adoption of ML
to the emerging applications [6]. In particular, deep neural
networks (DNNs) are known to be highly susceptible to even
small-scale adversarial attacks, as extensively demonstrated in
the computer vision domain [7]. Shared and broadcast nature
of wireless medium increases the potential for adversaries to
tamper with DL-based wireless communication tasks over the
air. However, it is not readily feasible to translate attack and
defense mechanisms from other data domains such as com-
puter vision to wireless communications that feature unique
characteristics. First, a wireless adversary cannot directly
manipulate input data to a DL algorithm running at a separate
target and its manipulation needs to reach the target over
the air through channel effects. Second, a wireless adversary
can attack multiple targets (each with a different channel)
simultaneously with a single (omnidirectional) transmission
due to the broadcast nature of wireless communications.
In this paper, we present realistic wireless attacks built upon
adversarial ML and corresponding defense by accounting for
channel and broadcast transmission effects in algorithm design
for adversarial attacks. Different types of wireless attacks
have been developed with adversarial ML [8] such as the
exploratory attack (that aims to learn the inner workings of
an ML algorithm), the poisoning attack (that manipulates
training process of ML), and the adversarial attack or the
evasion attack (that manipulates input data to ML in test
time). In this paper, we consider the adversarial attack that
corresponds to small modifications of the original input to the
DNNs that make DL algorithm misclassify the input. These
small modifications are not just random noise (such as in
conventional jamming [9]) but carefully designed in a way
that changes the decision of the DL algorithm. This attack has
been studied in [10] by directly manipulating the receiver’s
input data to the modulation classifier. In this setting, the
perturbation has been selected by the adversary according to
a power budget without considering channel effects on the
received perturbation (therefore this setting corresponds to the
best case scenario for the adversary but it is not practical
for realistic channel environments). However, this approach
(also followed in subsequent studies [11]–[20]) cannot ensure
that the adversarial perturbation that reaches the receiver has
the necessary power and phase characteristics to fool the
target classifier under realistic wireless channel conditions.
In addition, only a single receiver has been considered in
[10]–[20], and broadcast attacks on multiple receivers and
associated channel effects have not been studied yet. In this
paper, we show the need for a channel-aware adversarial attack
that can simultaneously work against multiple receivers by
showing that (a) the design of adversarial perturbations without
taking realistic channel effects into account cannot fool a
modulation classifier and (b) an adversarial attack crafted for
the channel to a particular receiver is not effective against
another receiver with different channel characteristics (i.e., the
attack is receiver specific and cannot be used for a broadcast
attack launched simultaneously against multiple receivers).
By considering a DNN at each receiver to classify wireless
signals to modulation types, we design realistic adversarial
attacks in the presence of channel effects (from the adversary
to the receiver) and multiple classifiers at different receivers.
For that purpose, we start with a single receiver and determine
channel-aware adversarial perturbations (subject to a power
constraint) to reduce the accuracy of detecting the modulation
type at the receiver. We first propose two white-box attacks,
a targeted attack with minimum power and a non-targeted
attack, subject to channel effects known by the adversary. We
show that the adversarial attack cannot succeed if the channel
between the adversary and the receiver is not considered
when designing the adversarial perturbation. Then we present
algorithms to design adversarial perturbations by accounting
for known channel effects and show that the classifier accuracy
can be significantly reduced by channel-aware adversarial
attacks.
By relaxing the assumption of exact channel information
at the adversary, we present a white-box adversarial attack
with limited channel information available at the adversary.
We further relax assumptions regarding the information avail-
ability of transmitter input and classifier model, and introduce
a black-box universal adversarial perturbation (UAP) attack
for an adversary with limited information.
We also introduce a broadcast adversarial attack to fool
classifiers at different receivers with a single perturbation
transmission by leveraging the broadcast property of wireless
communications. First, we show that the channel-aware adver-
sarial perturbation is inherently selective in the sense that it
can fool a target classifier at one receiver (whose channel is
used in the attack design) but cannot fool a classifier at another
receiver because of different channels experienced at different
receivers. By considering channels to all receivers jointly,
we design the broadcast adversarial perturbation that can
simultaneously fool multiple classifiers at different receivers.
Using different levels of perturbation budget available relative
to noise power, our results illustrate the need to utilize channel
information in designing over-the-air adversarial attacks.
As a countermeasure, we present a defensemethod to reduce
the impact of the adversarial perturbation on the classifier
performance. Following the randomized smoothing approach
from [21]–[23] (previously applied in computer vision), the
training data for modulation classifier is augmented with
isotropic Gaussian noise to make the trained model robust
to adversarial perturbations in test time. We show that this
defense is effective in reducing the impact of adversarial
attacks on the classifier performance. We further consider
certified defense to guarantee classifier robustness of the
classifier accuracy against adversarial attacks. The classifier
is certified by augmenting the received signals with Gaussian
noise samples in test time and checking statistical significance
of classification results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
discusses related work. Section III describes the system model.
Sections IV and V present targeted and non-targeted white-box
adversarial attacks, respectively, using channel information.
Section VI considers the white-box adversarial attack with lim-
ited channel information. Section VII presents the UAP attack.
Section VIII introduces the broadcast adversarial perturbation
in the presence of multiple receivers. Section IX describes a
defense method to make the classifier robust to adversarial
perturbations. Section X concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Adversarial ML has been studied in wireless communica-
tions with different types of attacks. Exploratory (inference)
attacks have been considered in [24], [25], where an adversary
builds a DNN to learn the transmission pattern in the channel
and jam transmissions that would be otherwise successful.
Over-the-air spectrum poisoning (causative) attacks have been
considered in [26], [27], where an adversary falsifies a trans-
mitter’s spectrum sensing data over the air by transmitting
during the spectrum sensing period of the transmitter. Poi-
soning attacks have been extended to cooperative spectrum
sensing [28]. Trojan attacks have been studied in [29] against a
modulation classifier, where an adversary slightly manipulates
training data by inserting Trojans (in terms of phase shifts)
that are later activated in test time.
Adversarial attacks (a.k.a evasion attacks) introduce small
modifications to the input data to the DNNs such that the
DL algorithm cannot reliably classify the input data. [30]
has showed that the end-to-end autoencoder communication
systems, proposed in [31], are vulnerable to adversarial attacks
that increase the block-error-rate at the receiver. Adversarial
attacks have been also considered against spectrum sensing in
[32] and MIMO channel state information (CSI) feedback [33].
One particular application of DNNs that has gained recent
interest in wireless communications is signal classification [5],
[34]–[36]. Adversarial attacks have been studied against mod-
ulation classifiers in [10] and subsequent studies [11]–[18].
Targeted fast gradient method (FGM) attack [37] has been used
in [10] by enforcing the DNNs to misclassify the input signals
to a target label. Here, the target is decided by searching
over all possible target labels and selecting the one with the
least perturbation required to enforce misclassification. It has
been shown that the modulation classifier used in [5] incurs
major errors under adversarial attacks with different power
levels used for perturbation signals. Carlini-Wagner attack [38]
has been considered in [14] to perturb RF data points and
the corresponding defense mechanism based on pre-trained
classifier using autoencoder is considered in [16]. Adversarial
perturbation is also used to defend against an intruder trying
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Fig. 1. System model.
to intercept the modulation scheme used at transmitter in
[19], [20], where the adversarial perturbation is added to the
transmitted signal to fool intruders while maintaining the bit
error rate between the transmitter and the receiver.
These previous works have added adversarial perturbations
directly to the receiver input without considering channel
effects from the adversary to the receiver. However, even a
small channel effect (pathloss or fading) would significantly
reduce the impact of adversarial perturbation by reducing the
received perturbation power just below the necessary power
level or tilting the perturbation to a different direction such that
the adversarial attack fails in changing classification decision
over the air. Furthermore, due to the broadcast nature of
wireless communications, it is possible for an adversary to
attack multiple receivers (each with a different channel from
the adversary) simultaneously with a common adversarial
perturbation although previous works have only considered
attacks on a single receiver.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless communication system that consists
of a transmitter,m receivers, and an adversary as shown in Fig.
1. All nodes are equipped with a single antenna and operate
on the same channel. Each receiver classifies its received
signals with a DNN to the modulation type that is used
by the transmitter. In the meantime, the adversary transmits
perturbation signals over the air to fool the classifier at the
receiver into making errors in modulation classification.
The DNN classifier at the ith receiver is denoted by
f (i)(·; θi) : X → RC , where θi is the parameters of the DNN
at receiver i and C is the number of modulation types. Note
X ⊂ Cp, where p is the dimension of the complex-valued
(in-phase/quadrature) inputs that can be also represented by
concatenation of two real-valued inputs. The classifier f (i)
assigns a modulation type lˆ(i)(x, θi) = argmaxk f
(i)
k (x, θi)
to every input x ∈ X where f (i)k (x, θi) is the output of ith
classifier corresponding to the kth modulation type.
The channel from the transmitter to the ith receiver
is denoted by htri and the channel from the adver-
sary to the ith receiver is denoted by hari , where
htri = [htri,1, htri,2, · · · , htri,p]T ∈ Cp×1 and hari =
[hari,1, hari,2, · · · , hari,p]T ∈ Cp×1. If the transmitter trans-
mits x, the ith receiver receives rtri = Htrix + ni,
if there is no adversarial attack, or receives rari(δ) =
Htrix + Hariδ + ni, if the adversary launches an ad-
versarial attack by transmitting the perturbation signal δ,
where Htri = diag{htri,1, · · · , htri,p} ∈ Cp×p,Hari =
diag{hari,1, · · · , hari,p} ∈ Cp×p, δ ∈ Cp×1 and ni ∈ Cp×1
is complex Gaussian noise. To make the attack stealth (i.e.,
hard to detect), the adversarial perturbation δ is restricted as
‖δ‖22 ≤ Pmax for some suitable power budget defined by Pmax.
The adversary determines the (common) adversarial pertur-
bation δ for the input x and all of the classifiers f (i) for
i = 1, 2, · · · ,m by solving the optimization (1).
argmin
δ
‖δ‖2
subject to lˆ(i)(rtri , θi) 6= lˆ(i)(rari(δ), θi) i = 1, 2, ...,m
‖δ‖22 ≤ Pmax. (1)
In (1), the objective is to minimize the perturbation power
subject to two constraints (a) each receiver misclassifies the
received signal and (b) the budget for total perturbation power
is not exceeded. Note that the best solution is not necessarily
realized at ‖δ‖22 = Pmax due to the complicated decision
boundary of the DNN that depends on the power and phase
of perturbation.
In practice solving (1) is difficult because of the nonlinearity
of the DNN. Thus, different methods have been proposed
(primarily in the computer vision domain) to approximate
the adversarial perturbation. For instance, FGM is a com-
putationally efficient method for crafting adversarial attacks
by linearizing the loss function of the DNN classifier. Let
L(θ,x,y) denote the loss function of the model (at any given
receiver), where y ∈ {0, 1}C is the class vector. Then FGM
linearizes the loss function in a neighborhood of x and uses
this linearized function for optimization.
We consider two types of attacks called targeted attacks and
non-targeted attacks that involve different objective functions
to optimize. In a targeted attack, the adversary aims to generate
a perturbation that causes the classifier at the receiver to
misclassify the input to target class (label), e.g., QPSK modu-
lated signals is classified as QAM16. In a non-targeted FGM
attack, the adversary searches for an attack that causes any
misclassification (independent of target class). More details
on these two types of attacks are provided in Section IV.
Our goal in is paper is to design adversarial perturbation
attacks to fool potentially multiple classifiers while consider-
ing the channel effects. For the white-box adversarial attacks,
we assume that the adversary knows for all i (a) the DNN
architecture (θi and L
(i)(·)) of the classifier at the ith receiver,
(b) the input at the ith receiver and consequently (c) the
channel hari between the adversary and the ith receiver. We
will relax these assumptions in Sections VI and VII.
We compare the performances of the attacks proposed in
this paper with the benchmark attack from [10] that adds
the adversarial perturbation directly to the receiver signal
without accounting for channel effects from the adversary to
a receiver. For performance evaluation, we use the VT-CNN2
classifier from [31] as the modulation classifier (also used in
[10]) where the classifier consists of two convolution layers
and two fully connected layers, and train it with GNU radio
ML dataset RML2016.10a [39]. The dataset contains 220,000
samples. Each sample corresponds to one specific modulation
scheme at a specific signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). There are
11 modulations: BPSK, QPSK, 8PSK, QAM16, QAM64,
CPFSK, GFSK, PAM4, WBFM, AM-SSB and AM-DSB. We
follow the same setup of [31], using Keras with TensorFlow
backend, where the input sample to the modulation classifier
is 128 I/Q (in-phase/quadrature) channel symbols. Half of the
samples are used for training and the other half are used in
test time.
IV. TARGETED WHITE-BOX ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
USING CHANNEL INFORMATION
We start with a single receiver, i.e., m = 1, and omit
the index i of the ith receiver for simplicity in Sections
IV-VII. We will extend the setup to multiple receivers in
Section VIII. For the targeted attack, the adversary minimizes
L(θ, rar,y
target) with respect to δ, where ytarget is one-hot
encoded desired target class (label). FGM is used to linearize
the loss function as L(θ, rar,y
target) ≈ L(θ, rtr,ytarget) +
(Harδ)
T∇xL(θ, rtr,ytarget) that is minimized by setting
Harδ = −α∇xL(θ, rtr,ytarget), where α is a scaling factor
to constrain the adversarial perturbation power to Pmax.
The adversary can generate different targeted attacks with
respect to different ytarget that causes the classifier at the
receiver to misclassify the received signals to C − 1 different
modulation types. Thus, as in [10], the adversary can create
targeted attacks for all C − 1 modulation types and chooses
the target modulation that uses the least power. The case
considered in [10] corresponds to Har = I without realistic
channel effects. We call the targeted attack perturbation in
[10] as δNoCh, which is an optimal targeted attack without
channel consideration (this corresponds to Algorithm 1 by
setting Har = I). In the following subsections, we propose
three targeted adversarial attacks to account for the effects of
the channel.
A. Channel Inversion Attack
We first begin with a naive attack, where the adversary
designs its attack by inverting the channel in the optimal tar-
geted attack δNoCh, which is obtained using Algorithm 1 with
Har = I. Since the adversarial attack goes through channel
har, the jth element of the perturbation δ is simply designed
as δj =
δNoChj
har,j
so that after going through the channel it has the
same direction as δNoChj for j = 1, · · · , p. Furthermore, in order
to satisfy the power constraint Pmax, we introduce a scaling
factor α so that δdiv = −αδ, where α =
√
Pmax
‖δ‖2 to satisfy
the power constraint at the adversary. Thus, the perturbation
received at the receiver is Harδ
div = −αδNoCh.
B. Minimum Mean Squared Error (MMSE) Attack
In the MMSE attack, the adversary designs the perturbation
δMMSE so that the distance between the perturbation after going
through the channel and the optimal targeted perturbation at
the receiver (which corresponds to Har = I) is minimized.
By designing the attack in this way, the received attack at
the receiver is close to the optimal targeted attack as much as
possible while satisfying the power constraint at the adversary.
However, since the classifier is sensitive to not only the
direction but also the power of perturbation, the squared
error criterion might penalize the candidates of δMMSE , which
have more power with the direction of δNoCh, i.e., we set
δMMSE = γδNoCh to search for all magnitudes of the δNoCh.
Therefore, we formulate the optimization problem to select
the perturbation δMMSE as
min
δMMSE
‖HarδMMSE − γδNoCh‖22
subject to ‖δMMSE‖22 ≤ Pmax, (2)
where γ is optimized by line search. We can write (2) as
min
δMMSE
j
p∑
j=1
‖har,jδMMSEj − γδNoChj ‖22
subject to
p∑
j=1
‖δMMSEj ‖22 ≤ Pmax. (3)
We solve the convex optimization problem (3) by using
Lagrangian method. The Lagrangian for (3) is given by
L =
p∑
j=1
‖har,jδMMSEj −γδNoChj ‖22+λ

 p∑
j=1
‖δMMSEj ‖22−Pmax

 ,
(4)
where λ ≥ 0. The KarushKuhnTucker (KKT) conditions are
given by
h∗ar,j(har,jδ
MMSE
j − γδNoChj ) + λδMMSEj = 0, (5)
for j = 1, · · · , p. From the KKT conditions, we obtain the
perturbation of the MMSE attack as
δMMSEj = −
γh∗ar,jδ
NoCh
j
h∗ar,jhar,j + λ
, (6)
for j = 1, · · · , p, where λ is determined by the power
constraint at the adversary. Note that the received perturbation
at the receiver is Harδ
MMSE = −αTδNoCh, where α ∈ Rp×1
and the jth element of α is αj =
γhar,jh
∗
ar,j
h∗
ar,j
har,j+λ
.
C. Maximum Received Perturbation Power (MRPP) Attack
In the MRPP attack, the adversary selects the perturbation
δMRPP to maximize the received perturbation power at the
receiver and analyzes how the received perturbation power
affects the decision process of the classifier. To maximize the
received perturbation power and effectively fool the classifier
into making a specific classification error, the adversary has
to fully utilize the channel between the adversary and the
Algorithm 1 MRPP attack
1: Inputs: input rtr, desired accuracy εacc, power constraint
Pmax and model of the classifier
2: Initialize: ε← 0C×1
3: for class-index c in range(C) do
4: εmax ← Pmax, εmin ← 0
5: δcnorm =
H
∗
ar∇xL(θ,rtr,yc)
(‖H∗ar∇xL(θ,rtr,yc)‖2)
6: while εmax − εmin > εacc do
7: εavg ← (εmax + εmin)/2
8: xadv ← x− εavgHarδcnorm
9: if lˆ(xadv) == ltrue then
10: εmin ← εavg
11: else
12: εmax ← εavg
13: end if
14: end while
15: ε[c] = εmax
16: end for
17: target = argmin ε, δMRPP = −√Pmaxδtargetnorm
receiver. Thus, if the targeted attack δtargetj is multiplied by
the conjugate of the channel, h∗ar,j , to maximize the re-
ceived perturbation power along the channel har,j , then the
received perturbation after going through the channel becomes
‖har,j‖22δtargetj . In the MRPP attack, not only the direction of
the adversarial perturbation is unaffected after going through
the channel but also the power of the adversarial perturbation
is maximized by utilizing the channel. Finally, the adversary
generates the targeted attack for every possible modulation
type to decide the target class and calculate the scaling factor
to satisfy the power constraint at the adversary. The details are
presented in Algorithm 1.
D. Attack Performance
We assume that the channel between the adversary and the
receiver is Rayleigh fading with path-loss and shadowing, i.e.,
har,j = K(
d0
d
)γψhray,j where K = 1, d0 = 1, d = 10, γ =
2.7, ψ ∼ Lognormal(0, 8) and hray,j ∼ Rayleigh(0, 1). We
use the perturbation-to-noise ratio (PNR) metric from [10] that
captures the relative perturbation with respect to the noise and
measure how the increase in the PNR affects the accuracy of
the classifier. Note that as PNR increases, it is more likely for
the attack to be detected by the receiver. In the performance
evaluation figures, we denote the targeted attack by TA, the
non-targeted attack by NTA and the broadcast attack by BC.
Fig. 2 presents the classifier accuracy vs. PNR under the
proposed targeted white-box adversarial attacks with exact
channel information and compares them with the adversarial
attack studied in [10]. As expected, the white-box attack in
[10] without considering the necessary channel effects from
the adversary to the receiver has poor performance that is close
to no attack case in low PNR region. The reason is that the
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Fig. 2. Classifier accuracy under adversarial attacks with and without
considering wireless channel effects when SNR = 10 dB.
Algorithm 2 Naive non-targeted attack
1: Inputs: input rtr, number of iterations E, power constraint
Pmax, true class y
true and model of the classifier
2: Initialize: Sum of gradient ∆← 0 , x← rtr
3: for e in range(E) do
4: δnorm =
∇xL(θ,x,ytrue)
(‖∇xL(θ,x,ytrue)‖2)
5: x← x+
√
Pmax
E
Harδnorm
6: ∆← ∆+
√
Pmax
E
δnorm
7: end for
8: δnaive =
√
Pmax
∆
‖∆‖2
wireless channel changes the phase and the magnitude of the
perturbation at the receiver. Further, we see that the targeted
channel inversion attack does not perform well compared to
the targeted MRPP attack, indicating the importance of the
received power at the classifier.
V. NON-TARGETED WHITE-BOX ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
USING CHANNEL INFORMATION
The objective of the non-targeted attack is to maximize the
loss function L(θ, rar,y
true), where ytrue is the true class of x.
FGM is used to linearize the loss function as L(θ, rar,y
true) ≈
L(θ, rtr,y
true) + (Harδ)
T∇xL(θ, rtr,ytrue) that is maxi-
mized by setting Harδ = α∇xL(θ, rtr,ytrue), where α is a
scaling factor to constrain the adversarial perturbation power
to Pmax. Based on FGM, we introduce three non-targeted
adversarial attacks.
A. Naive Non-Targeted Attack
First, the adversary divides its power Pmax into the number
of iterations, E, in Algorithm 2 and uses Pmax
E
amount of
power to the gradient of loss function to tilt the transmitted
signal from the transmitter. Next, the adversary calculates the
gradient again with respect to the transmitted signal from the
transmitter and added perturbation. Then the adversary adds
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Fig. 3. Classifier accuracy under different white-box adversarial attacks when
SNR = 10 dB.
another perturbation with power Pmax
E
using the new gradient
δnorm as
x← x+
√
Pmax
E
Harδnorm. (7)
This scheme generates the best direction to increase the loss
function at that specific instance. Finally, the adversary repeats
this procedure E times and sums all the gradients of the loss
function that were added to the transmitted signal from the
transmitter since the adversary can send only one perturbation
at a time over the air. Finally, a scaling factor is introduced to
satisfy the power constraint at the adversary. The details are
presented in Algorithm 2.
B. Minimum Mean Squared Error (MMSE) Attack
The non-targeted MMSE attack is designed similar to the
targeted MMSE attack. The adversary first obtains δNoCh from
the naive non-targeted attack withHar = I and uses it to solve
problem (2). Thus, the solution is the same as the solution to
(2) except that it has the opposite direction to maximize the
loss function, whereas the targeted attack minimizes the loss
function. Therefore, the perturbation selected by the MMSE
scheme for non-targeted attack is δMMSE = αT δNoCh, where
α ∈ Rp and the jth element of α is αj = γh
∗
ar,j
h∗
ar,i
har,j+λ
.
C. Maximum Received Perturbation Power (MRPP) Attack
As we have seen in the targeted MRPP attack, the attack
should be in the form of δMRPP = H∗arδ
target to maximize
the received perturbation power at the receiver. Thus, the
naive non-targeted attack is changed to create the MRPP non-
targeted attack by changing δnorm in Line 5 of Algorithm 2
to
δnorm =
H
∗
ar∇xL(θ,x,ytrue)
(‖H∗ar∇xL(θ,x,ytrue)‖2)
. (8)
D. Attack Performance
The performance of the proposed white-box attacks is
compared in Fig. 3 under the same simulation environment
used in Section IV-D. As we discussed in Section IV-B, γ can
be optimized with line search for the targeted MMSE attack,
e.g., it performs better with γ = 1.2 compared to γ = 1.
It is observed that the naive non-targeted attack performs
poorly compared to other attacks and the non-targeted MRPP
attack outperforms all other attacks in most of the PNR
region. This can be explained by the freedom of the direction
that the non-targeted adversarial attack can take. For targeted
attacks, we can only have 10 different directions since we
have 11 modulation types. However, the non-targeted attack
does not have such a restriction. Thus, it is more likely that
the non-targeted attack chooses a better direction to enforce
misclassification. Moreover, the computation complexity for
non-targeted attacks is lower compared to the targeted attacks
that involve iterations to reach the desired accuracy.
VI. WHITE-BOX ADVERSARIAL ATTACK WITH LIMITED
CHANNEL INFORMATION
The adversarial attacks that are designed in the previous
sections use the exact information of the channel (from the
adversary to the receiver). However, this information may
not always be available in practical scenarios. Therefore, in
this section, we present Algorithm 3 to generate adversarial
attacks using a lower-dimensional representation of channel
distribution. One classical approach for dimensional reduction
is principal component analysis (PCA) that was also used in
[10] for the case when the signal is directly manipulated at
the receiver. PCA is performed by eigenvalue decomposition
of the data covariance matrix or singular value decomposition
of a data matrix and is used to obtain the principal component
which has the largest variance, i.e., PCA finds the principal
component that provides the most information about the data
with reduced dimension by projecting the data onto it.
To generate an adversarial attack with limited channel
information, we first generateN realizations of the channel be-
tween the adversary and the receiver {H(1)ar ,H(2)ar , · · · ,H(N)ar }
from a known distribution. Then we generate N adversarial
attacks using white-box attack algorithms from the previous
sections, either targeted or non-targeted, using N realizations
of the channel and the known input rtr at the classifier.
Finally, we stack N generated adversarial attacks in a matrix
and find the principal component of the matrix to use it as
the adversarial attack with limited channel information. The
details are presented in Algorithm 3.
VII. UNIVERSAL ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATION (UAP)
ATTACK
In the previous sections, the adversary designs a white-box
attack with the assumptions that it knows the model of the
classifier at the receiver, the channel between the adversary
and the receiver, and the exact input at the receiver. However,
these assumptions are not always practical in real wireless
communications systems. Thus, in this section, we relax these
assumptions and present the UAP attacks.
A. UAP Attack with Pre-Collected Input at the Receiver
We first relax the assumption that the adversary knows the
exact input of the classifier. The adversary in the previous
Algorithm 3 Adversarial attack with limited channel informa-
tion
1: Inputs: N channel realization {H(1)ar , · · · ,H(N)ar }, input
rtr and model of the classifier
2: Initialize: ∆← 0
3: for n in range(N ) do
4: Find δ(n) from white-box attack algorithm using rtr
and H
(n)
ar
5: Stack δ(n) to ∆
6: end for
7: Compute the first principle direction v1 of ∆ using PCA
8: ∆ = UΣVT and v1 = Ve1
9: δlimited =
√
Pmaxv1
attacks generates an input-dependent perturbation, i.e., δ is
designed given the exact input rtr. This requires the adversary
to always know the input of the classifier, which is not a
practical assumption to make and hard to achieve due to
synchronization issues. Thus, it is more practical to design
an input-independent UAP.
We present an algorithm to design the UAP using PCA. We
assume that the adversary collects some arbitrary set of inputs
{r(1)tr , r(2)tr , · · · , r(N)tr } and associated classes. The adversary
generates perturbations {δ(1), δ(2), · · · , δ(N)} with respect to
the obtained arbitrary set of inputs and the exact channel
information using algorithms from the previous sections. To
reflect the common characteristics of {δ(1), δ(2), · · · , δ(N)}
in the UAP, we stack these perturbations into a matrix and
perform PCA to find the first component of the matrix with
the largest eigenvalue. Hence, we use the direction of the first
principal component as the direction of UAP for channelHar.
The algorithm for the UAP with N pre-collected input data is
similar to Algorithm 3. The difference is that there are N pre-
collected data inputs instead of N realizations of the channel.
B. UAP Attack with Limited Channel Information
We relax the assumption that the adversary knows the
exact channel between the adversary and the receiver, and
assume that the adversary only knows the distribution of this
channel. To design the UAP with only knowing the distribution
of the channel, we first generate random realizations of the
channel {H(1)ar ,H(2)ar , · · · ,H(N)ar } from the distribution. Then
we generate δ(n) using r
(n)
tr and H
(n)
ar for n = 1, · · · , N
instead of using the real channelHar and real input rtr. Again,
we use PCA to find the first component of the matrix and use
it as the direction of UAP. The algorithm for UAP with limited
channel information is analogous to Algorithm 3 except that
we have pre-collected input data as opposed to real input data
in Algorithm 3.
C. Black-box UAP Attack
The last assumption that we will relax is the information
about the DNN classifier model at the receiver. To relax this
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Fig. 4. Classifier accuracy under UAP attacks with different levels of
information availability when SNR = 10 dB.
assumption, we use the transferability property of adversarial
attacks [40]. This property states that the adversarial attack
crafted to fool a specific DNN can also fool other DNNs
with different models with high probability. Therefore, the
adversary generates UAPs using a substitute DNN that is
trained using arbitrary collected dataset and uses them to fool
the actual DNN at the receiver.
D. Attack Performance
Fig. 4 shows the performance of the adversarial attacks with
respect to different levels of information availability. First,
we observe that the UAP with 40 pre-collected data inputs,
where the adversary knows the exact channel information,
outperforms other attacks with limited information. This result
shows the importance of the channel state information over the
exact input data when crafting an adversarial attack. Note that
the UAP with 40 pre-collected data inputs even outperforms
the targeted channel inversion attack in the high PNR region,
where the adversary knows not only the exact channel but
also the exact input at the receiver. Furthermore, similar
performance of the UAP with limited channel information and
the black-box UAP shows transferability of adversarial attack,
where for the black-box UAP we use the substitute DNN
which has the same structure of the classifier, but trained with
a different training set so that the substitute DNN has different
weight values.
VIII. BROADCAST ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
We extend the adversarial attack to a broadcast (common)
adversarial perturbation that is transmitted by the adversary to
simultaneously fool multiple classifiers at different receivers.
First, we show that the channel-aware adversarial attack built
for a particular channel is inherently selective, namely it is
only effective against the receiver with that channel and not
effective against another receiver with a different channel.
Next, we show how to design a common adversarial per-
turbation by jointly accounting for multiple channels such
that the adversary can fool classifiers at multiple receivers
simultaneously with a single (omnidirectional) transmission.
We present the design of broadcast adversarial perturbation
only for the the case of the targeted adversarial attacks, as
other types of attacks can be formulated similarly.
A. Individual Design of Broadcast Adversarial Attack (IDBA)
We design IDBA by building upon Algorithm 1 (that was
designed against a signal receiver). By applying Algorithm
1 separately against each of m receivers, we obtain m ad-
versarial perturbations, δ(1), δ(2), · · · , δ(m), where δ(i) is the
adversarial perturbation generated Algorithm 1 for the ith
receiver. Since the adversary aims to fool all the receivers
by broadcasting a single adversarial perturbation, we combine
individual perturbations as a weighted sum,
∑m
i=1 wiδ
(i),
where wi is the weight for adversarial perturbation δ
(i),
and then normalize it to satisfy the power constraint at the
adversary (higher wi implies more priority given to δ
(i)).
Note that the optimal weights can be found by line search
subject to
∑m
i=1 wi = 1 and wi ≥ 0 for each i. Numerical
results suggest that the search space can be constrained by
selecting weights inversely proportional to channel gains of
corresponding receivers.
B. Joint Design of Broadcast Adversarial Attack (JDBA)
We generate the adversarial perturbation JDBA by modify-
ing Algorithm 1. Specifically, we change the computation of
δcnorm in Line 5 of Algorithm 1 from (8) to
δcnorm =
∑m
i=1 wiH
(i)∗
ar ∇xLi(θ, r(i)tr ,yc)
(‖∑mi=1 wiH(i)∗ar ∇xLi(θ, r(i)tr ,yc)‖2)
, (9)
search for every C − 1 classes and choose the class that fools
most of the receivers. Note that JDBA searches for a common
direction of δcnorm for all receivers. On the other hand, IDBA
searches separately for directions of adversarial perturbations
for different receivers and then combines them to a common
direction.
C. Attack Performance
For performance evaluation, we assume that there are two
receivers, m = 2, with different classifiers which have the
same architecture but trained with different training sets and
the adversary generates a broadcast adversarial perturbation to
fool both receivers simultaneously. We assume Rayleigh fad-
ing for both channel har1,j = K(
d0
d
)γψhray1,j from the adver-
sary to receiver 1, and the channel har2,j = K(
d0
d
)γψhray2,j
from the adversary to receiver 2, where hray1,j and hray2,j ∼
Rayleigh(0, 1).
Fig. 5 shows the accuracy of the classifiers with respect to
different broadcast adversarial attacks. Note that the accuracy
is the same for both classifiers since we assume that the broad-
cast adversarial attack is successful if it fools both receivers at
the same time. It is observed that JDBA outperforms IDBA for
all PNRs. Furthermore, the weight selection w1 =
1
2 , w2 =
1
2
outperforms other weight selections suggesting that the weight
selection is related to the channel distribution. Also, when
weights w1 = 1 and w2 = 0 are selected in IDBA, the attack
generated only for receiver 1 has no effect on receiver 2, i.e.,
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Fig. 6. Classifier accuracy under broadcast adversarial attacks at receivers
with different channel distributions when SNR = 10 dB.
the attack selectively fools receiver 1 due to different channel
effects. This observation raises the need to craft a broadcast
adversarial perturbation.
Next, we distinguish channel distributions for the two re-
ceivers and evaluate the classifier accuracy under the JDBA
attack in Fig. 6. The channel from the adversary to receiver 1,
and the channel from the adversary to receiver 2 are modeled
with Rayleigh fading of different variances, i.e., hray1,j ∼
Rayleigh(0, 1), hray2,j ∼ Rayleigh(0, 2). The weight selection
w1 =
2
3 and w2 =
1
3 (where the weights are selected as
inversely proportional to the variance of the channel as we
have seen in Fig. 5) outperforms other weight selections.
IX. DEFENSE AGAINST ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
In this section, we introduce a defense method to increase
the robustness of wireless signal classification models against
adversarial perturbations. There are several defense methods
such as adversarial training that calculates an adversarial
perturbation and adds the perturbed samples to the training
set to increase the model robustness. However, adversarial
training only strengthens the classifier in few perturbation
directions, and as shown in [23], the classifier defended with
adversarial training remains susceptible to perturbations in
other directions making the classifier still vulnerable to black-
box attacks. In response, a line of work on certified defense
has been considered [21]–[23], [41]. A classifier is said to be
certifiably robust if the classifier’s prediction of a sample x
is constant in a small neighborhood around x, often defined
by an ℓ2 or ℓ∞ ball. Randomized smoothing (also referred to
as Gaussian smoothing) is a certified defense approach, which
augments the training set with Gaussian noise to increase the
robustness of the classifier to multiple directions. Recent work
has shown that a tight robustness guarantee in ℓ2 norm can
be achieved with randomized smoothing with Gaussian noise
[21]. Therefore, we apply randomized smoothing as a defense
method to make the modulation classifier robust to adversarial
attacks over the air.
In randomized smoothing, there are two parameters σ and k
that the defender can control, namely the standard deviation of
the Gaussian noise σ and the number of the noisy samples k
added to each training sample ri, i.e. ri+n1, ri+n2, . . . , ri+
nk, where ni is Gaussian noise with variance σ
2. These two
parameters balance the trade-off between the resulting clas-
sification accuracy and the robustness against perturbations.
Note that unlike the images used as input samples in computer
vision, the received signals in wireless communications are
already subject to noise, and randomized smoothing slightly
increases the noise level. However, as we will see in Section
IX-A, as the number of data samples in the training set is less
than the number of parameters in the neural network, data
augmentation in fact improves the classifier performance and
Gaussian smoothing does not cause any degradation.
A. Randomized Smoothing During Training
We evaluate the accuracy of the classifier for different
values of σ and k selected for Gaussian noise augmentation.
First, we fix k = 10 and change σ in Fig. 7 to study the
impact of the power of the Gaussian noise added to the
training set. It is observed that the accuracy of the classifier
trained with small values of σ such as σ = 0.001 and
σ = 0.005 is larger than that of the original classifier across all
PNR values. This result shows that randomized smoothing as
training data augmentation improves the classifier accuracy for
a small σ value, while degrading the performance when noise
with a large variance is introduced. Furthermore, there is an
intersection between accuracy vs. PNR curves for σ = 0.001
and σ = 0.005 due to the density of the norm ball that is
created around each training set. These results suggest that
when σ is small, the classifier becomes more robust to a small
perturbation, but more susceptible to a large perturbation. We
observe a similar crossover for large σ values (e.g., σ = 0.01)
where the classifier is more robust to a large perturbation, but
susceptible to a small perturbation.
In Fig. 8, we keep the noise variance σ constant and vary the
number of samples k added to the training set to investigate
its effect on the classifier robustness. Our results demonstrate
that by adding more augmentation samples to training set
increases the robustness of the classifier against the adversarial
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Fig. 7. Classifier accuracy when trained with (10, σ) Gaussian noise
augmentation with different σ and SNR = 10 dB.
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augmentation with different k and SNR = 10 dB.
perturbation when compared to the original classifier trained
without any defense. However, this defense advantage comes
at the cost of increased training time.
B. Certified Defense in Test Time
The defense results can be certified with a desired con-
fidence by using randomized smoothing in prediction time.
Consider the classifier trained with k = 20 and σ = 0.001. For
each perturbed test sample, we draw k Gaussian noise samples
with the same variance and label them with the classifier. Let
cˆA and cˆB denote the classes that occurred most and second
most, and nA and nB represent the occurrence of these two
classes, respectively. We then apply a two-sided hypothesis test
and check if BinomPValue(nA, nA + nB, q) ≤ α condition
is satisfied, where BinomPValue(·) returns p-value of the
two-sided hypothesis test that nA ∼ Binomial(nA + nB, q)
[21], 1 − q is the confidence level, and α is the probability
of returning an incorrect answer. If the condition is satisfied,
the classifier is very confident in its prediction. If not, then
the classifier abstains and does not make a prediction. For
example, when we consider 95% confidence, we observe that
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Fig. 9. Constellation points of the received signal with adversarial perturbation
and randomized smoothing samples for the cases (a) when the classifier
abstains and (b) when then classifier recovers the perturbed signal and
correctly infers the label.
a test sample that belongs to class “QAM64” is perturbed by
adversary to be classified as “QAM16” at the receiver. When
randomized smoothing is applied in prediction, we observe
that the classifier infers the samples as class “QAM16” for
6 times and as class “QAM64” for 14 times, resulting in an
BinomPValue(·) = 0.115. Since the condition is not satisfied,
the classifier abstains. Another example is a test sample of
“QAM64” that is perturbed by the adversary to be classified as
“8PSK”. When randomized smoothing is applied in prediction,
the classifier correctly infers all k samples as “QAM64” and
the defense is certified with 95% confidence. The constellation
of the two examples are shown respectively in Fig. 9(a)-(b).
X. CONCLUSION
We presented over-the-air adversarial attacks against deep
learning-based modulation classifiers by accounting for real-
istic channel and broadcast transmission effects. Specifically,
we considered targeted, non-targeted and UAP attacks with
different levels of uncertainty regarding channels, transmitter
inputs and DNN classifier models. We showed that these
channel-aware adversarial attacks can successfully fool a mod-
ulation classifier over the air. Then we introduced broadcast
adversarial attacks to simultaneously fool multiple classifiers
at different receivers with a single transmission. First, we
showed that an adversarial perturbation designed for a par-
ticular receiver is not effective against another receiver due
to channel differences. Therefore, we designed a common
adversarial perturbation by considering all channel effects
jointly and showed that this broadcast attack can fool all
receivers. Finally, we presented a certified defense method
using randomized smoothing, and showed that it is effective
in reducing the impact of adversarial attacks on the classifier
performance.
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